Compound threats, in which cyberattacks compound the damage caused by natural hazards are an increasing concern for critical infrastructure, with an emerging trend of sophisticated cyberattacks targeting infrastructure that is already damaged or stressed by natural threats.
Our recent research has shown that no existing power grid Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system architectures can adequately withstand compound threats. This includes fault-tolerant architectures commonly deployed in industry, as well as state-of-the-art intrusion-tolerant architectures designed to withstand cyberattacks. Natural hazards may simultaneously make large parts of the infrastructure unavailable, making it infeasible for any static system architecture to withstand these threats.
There is an opportunity to improve resilience by integrating a mobile control center that can be deployed in the aftermath of a natural hazard. If existing control centers are rendered inoperable by a natural hazard (e.g. flooded by a hurricane), a mobile control center may be deployed to resume operations. However, protocols and software support for integrating a mobile control center into a SCADA system are missing today.
This project addresses the following key gap in integrating a mobile control center for improved resilience of power grid SCADA: